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 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
In the Matter of Kathleen Devereaux Cauthen, 
Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002472 
 
 
  
Respondent has submitted a Motion to Resign in lieu of Discipline pursuant to 
Rule 35 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in 
Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  We grant the Motion to 
Resign in Lieu of Discipline.  In accordance with the provisions of Rule 35, RLDE, 
respondent's resignation shall be permanent.   
 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall file an affidavit 
with the Clerk of Court showing that she has complied with Rule 30, RLDE, and 
shall also surrender her Certificate of Admission to Practice Law to the Clerk of 
Court. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  C.J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January 12, 2017 
 
ORDER 
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Petitioner is currently admitted to practice law in South Carolina, and has now 
submitted a resignation under Rule 409 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules. The resignation is accepted. 
 
If petitioner is currently representing any South Carolina clients, petitioner shall 
immediately notify those clients of the resignation by certified mail, return receipt 
requested. Further, if petitioner is currently counsel of record before any court of 
this State, petitioner shall immediately move to be relieved as counsel in that 
matter. 
 
Within twenty (20) days of the date of this order, petitioner shall: 
 
(1) surrender the certificate of admission to the Clerk of this Court.  If 
petitioner cannot locate this certificate, petitioner shall provide the Clerk with an 
affidavit indicating this fact and indicating that the certificate will be immediately 
surrendered if it is subsequently located. 
 
(2) provide an affidavit to the Clerk of this Court showing that petitioner has 
fully complied with the requirements of this order. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  C.J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
Columbia, South Carolina  
January12, 2017 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Jennifer B. Arends, Petitioner 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002506 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
 
 
In the Matter of Gregory Payne Sloan, Esquire, 
Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2017-000009 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) asks this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules.  Respondent consents to the issuance of an order of interim suspension in 
this matter. 
 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall serve and file the 
affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE.  Should respondent fail to timely file the 
required affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal contempt of this 
Court as provided by Rule 30, RLDE. 
 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  C.J. 
FOR THE COURT 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January13, 2017 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Walker Manning Hughes, Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-000294 
Appeal From Greenville County 
J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5465 

Heard September 21, 2016 – Filed January 11, 2017 

AFFIRMED 
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of 
Columbia, for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy 
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and 
Assistant Attorney General Caroline M. Scrantom, all of 
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of 
Greenville, for Respondent.
MCDONALD, J.:  Walker Manning Hughes appeals his convictions for murder, 
first-degree burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a weapon during the 
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commission of a violent crime, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) admitting 
prejudicial hearsay testimony and (2) denying his motion to require the State to 
open fully on the law and the facts during closing arguments.  We affirm.  
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hughes's mother, Karen Hughes (Victim), was the beneficiary of two trusts which 
were to be divided between Hughes and his brother, Larry Hughes, upon her death.  
Two days before Victim's murder, Hughes was released from the Greenville 
County Detention Center after pleading guilty to forging checks written on 
Victim's trust account.  Hughes received a probationary sentence and was ordered 
to have no contact with Victim.
Victim's coworker, Kim Jones, testified that on Friday, April 8, 2011, Victim left 
work early to meet a repairman and reapply for a restraining order against Hughes.  
Victim was last seen alive by a neighbor that afternoon.  At that time, Victim was 
wearing a brown track suit. Neighbors reported the lights at Victim's home were 
off that Friday night and remained off throughout the weekend. On Monday, April 
11, neighbor Max Few went to Victim's house after learning from Jones that 
Victim had not arrived at work.  Few called police after noticing Victim's car was 
gone, Victim's dog was uncharacteristically locked on the back porch, and the 
screen door to the porch had been cut.  Police forced entry onto the property by 
cutting a padlock off the front gate and breaking through the front door, which had 
been secured by a deadbolt. 
Inside, police discovered Victim's badly beaten body1 surrounded by bloody 
footprints.2  Police also discovered a bloody knife on the kitchen counter, as well 
as a washed claw hammer and brush in the washing machine.3  In Victim's 
1 Victim was wearing a brown sweat shirt and sweat pants. 
2 The medical examiner opined Victim died of blunt force trauma to the head and 
believed there were at least eleven separate impacts. 
3 Visible brush marks suggested an attempt was made to clean some blood off of a 
door. Additionally, fabric imprints in some of the blood stains suggested Victim's 
killer wore gloves. 
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bedroom, police found the contents of her purse spread out on the bed and several 
drawers that had been opened and stacked on the floor.4  Sergeant Chris Miller of 
the Greenville County Sheriff's Office testified the crime appeared to be personal 
because neither jewelry nor electronics were taken and many of the rooms were 
undisturbed. The only items missing from the home were Victim's car, her car 
keys, and a garage door opener.  
On the evening of April 11, police found Hughes in Victim's car at a gas station in 
Laurens County. When police searched the car, they discovered the missing car 
keys and Victim's garage door opener in the driver's side door pocket.
Additionally, they found Hughes's blood around the driver's seat as well as on a 
pair of Conair electric clippers and their box.  Police found a small cut on one of 
Hughes's index fingers.
DNA testing at Victim's home revealed that a swab of blood taken from the 
upstairs bedroom closet and a swab of blood from the living room contained 
Victim's blood mixed with that of someone else.  Specifically, the State's forensic 
DNA analyst, Brian Browning, testified the bedroom closet swab contained a 
mixture of three individuals, with Victim as a major contributor and two minor 
trace alleles identified with Hughes and an unknown individual.  Browning 
explained that alleles are "individual pieces of a DNA profile" and cautioned that 
he was "not speaking about a [complete] profile."  Browning further explained that 
the unknown contributor could be the result of instrument limitations in detecting 
individual pieces of a DNA profile or "the possible masking of certain alleles due 
to a mixture sample where several contributors can overlap each other."  On cross-
examination, Browning clarified that minor trace alleles were detected and "they 
included some of the alleles of Walker Manning Hughes as well as [an] unknown 
individual." 
Concerning the living room swab, Browning testified Victim was a major 
contributor to the sample and there was also a minor male contributor.  He opined 
there was "a high probability of it being a mother/son mixture" and was able to 
exclude Hughes's brother as a donor.  Conversely, the expert stated he could not 
exclude Hughes and the probability of including someone at random as a minor 
contributor was one in two hundred forty-one among the Caucasian population.   
4 Police also noted Victim's bedroom door had its own deadbolt.
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Michael Isakson, who knew Hughes from their time at the Greenville County 
Detention Center, testified Hughes was angry that Victim had obtained a 
restraining order against him and that Hughes offered him $70,000 to beat Victim
to death. Isakson stated that when he declined the offer, Hughes indicated he 
would have to do it himself.  According to Isakson, Hughes further claimed that, 
despite the restraining order, he planned to go to Victim's house when he was 
released to "collect some money and stuff."
Sheryl Slavensky, Hughes's friend and past romantic interest, testified that 
sometime in 2009 or 2010, she had a conversation with Hughes, during which he 
was furious and blamed Victim for his parents' divorce.  According to Slavensky, 
Hughes stated he wanted to kill Victim and "bash her head in."  He said he "wanted 
it to be slow and he wanted to be able to watch her face."  Slavensky testified she 
informed Victim of the threat. 
Hughes took the stand in his own defense.  He testified that when he was released 
from jail on April 6, he walked to Victim's house, where he arrived at dusk on 
April 8. He then waited until Victim returned from walking her dog and spoke 
with her outside the home until she invited him inside.  According to Hughes, he 
told Victim he had a young daughter whom Victim did not know about. When 
Hughes revealed the child's mother had doubts about the child's paternity, Victim
instructed him to go get the child. Hughes claimed Victim then gave him $140 and 
escorted him to the garage, where she allowed him to take her car. Hughes stated 
Victim also gave him a Conair haircut kit, some candy, and packages of t-shirts 
and underwear.
Hughes then testified about his efforts in the following days to find the child's
mother.  When someone reported that the child's mother worked at a nearby 
Walmart, he traveled to several area stores to locate her.  Hughes claimed that 
while parked at the Simpsonville Walmart, he cut his finger on a broken meth pipe 
and had to stop the bleeding with items in the car.  After further travels, Hughes 
eventually ran out of gas at the Laurens County gas station where he was 
apprehended. According to Hughes, he thought Victim had reported the car stolen 
and he "choked up" when an investigator told him she had been murdered.
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
I.  Hearsay Testimony 
Hughes argues any testimony concerning the reasons Victim feared him was 
inadmissible hearsay and highly prejudicial. Specifically, Hughes challenges 
testimony by Margo Green, Ben Leaphart, Few, and Marion Beachum.  We find 
that even if some portion of this "fear" testimony was inadmissible, Hughes has 
failed to demonstrate the prejudice necessary to establish reversible error.
Before trial, the State indicated it planned to introduce evidence that Victim feared 
Hughes. The State relied on State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 625 S.E.2d 641 (2006),
and argued the fear testimony was relevant to the issue of whether Victim would 
have given Hughes permission to use her car.  The trial court's preliminary ruling 
was that Weston was "very much on point" and Rule 803(3), SCRE, would permit 
such testimony.
Green, Victim's longtime friend, testified that on April 8, Victim stated she was 
upset because Hughes had been released without her knowledge and she would 
have to "be especially careful now that he was back out on the street."  On cross-
examination, Green admitted that in a February 2011 email, Victim indicated 
Hughes's incarceration was "bittersweet" but that she had slept better since he was 
in jail. On redirect, Green stated Victim was "always afraid" and "on guard" when 
Hughes was not in jail and would lock herself in her bedroom with a deadbolt at 
night.
Leaphart, Victim's estate attorney, testified Victim indicated she was 
uncomfortable around Hughes, had some verbal confrontations with him, and was 
concerned about his "drug use and his lifestyle."
Few testified that on the day before the murder, Victim asked him to "watch out" 
for her because Hughes was out of jail and she feared Hughes would "come in and 
kill her." Few described Victim as frustrated and "very scared" during the 
conversation.
Beachum, Victim's trust officer, testified Victim indicated she was "deathly afraid" 
of Hughes and feared that if he ever got her alone, he would kill her. Beachum
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noted that Victim never expressed that level of fear toward her estranged husband 
or Hughes's brother. 
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."  State v. 
Washington, 379 S.C. 120, 123, 665 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2008).  "A ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Id. at 123–24, 665 S.E.2d at 604.  
"The improper admission of hearsay is reversible error only when the admission 
causes prejudice." Weston, 367 S.C. at 288, 625 S.E.2d at 646. 
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  
Rule 801, SCRE. Rule 803(3), SCRE, provides that a statement "of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as 
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed" is not excluded by the hearsay rule.  Our supreme court has held that 
"while the present state of the declarant's mind is admissible as an exception to 
hearsay, the reason for the declarant's state of mind is not." State v. Garcia, 334 
S.C. 71, 76, 512 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1999).  The court cautioned that "[i]f the
reservation in the text of the rule is to have any effect, it must be understood to
narrowly limit those admissible statements to declarations of condition—'I'm 
scared'—and not belief—'I'm scared because [someone] threatened me.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
In Garcia, appellant claimed the fatal shooting of his girlfriend was an accident.  
Id. at 73, 512 S.E.2d at 508. The victim's grandmother testified that on the day 
before the shooting, the victim indicated she had a bruise on her leg because 
appellant kicked her. Id.  The victim's cousin testified that a week before the 
shooting, the victim stated appellant threatened to kill her if she ever left him.  Id.
at 74, 512 S.E.2d at 508. Our supreme court held the testimony was improperly 
admitted under Rule 803 stating, "While their testimony presents circumstantial 
evidence of the decedent's fear of appellant and concern for her safety, the 
testimony improperly reveals the reason for her state of mind (i.e., that appellant 
had kicked and threatened to kill her)." Id. at 76, 512 S.E.2d at 509.
Weston involved a defendant accused of moving in with his elderly mother and 
then killing her. 367 S.C. at 282–84, 625 S.E.2d at 643–44.  One witness testified 
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the victim's demeanor changed from cheerful to unhappy and miserable once the 
defendant moved in with her.  Id. at 285–86, 625 S.E.2d at 644–45.  Another 
witness stated that in the weeks before the crime, the victim became anxious and 
nervous and asked that no one touch anything in the defendant's room because she 
was afraid. Id. at 286, 625 S.E.2d at 645. The supreme court held the witnesses' 
statements were properly admitted under Garcia because they did not include a 
reason for the victim's fear.  Id. at 287, 625 S.E.2d at 646. The court also stated, 
"To read Garcia as Weston suggests would require us to hold that a witness may
testify to the fact that the decedent was afraid, but not that the decedent was afraid 
of the defendant.  This is simply too constrained a reading of Garcia." Id. at 287– 
88, 625 S.E.2d at 646.  Alternatively, the court noted that even if the testimony had 
been improperly admitted, Weston had not been prejudiced because two other 
witnesses gave similar testimony without objection.  Id. at 288–89, 625 S.E.2d at 
646. 
In this case, the circuit court erred in admitting some of the challenged testimony, 
but Hughes cannot demonstrate the necessary resulting prejudice.  See id. at 288, 
625 S.E.2d at 646 ("The improper admission of hearsay is reversible error only 
when the admission causes prejudice.").  Specifically, Green testified that when 
she spoke to Victim on April 8, Victim was "upset because she had found out that 
[Hughes] had been released by the court, that the solicitor's office had failed to 
notify her, that she was now going to have to . . . be especially careful." Leaphart 
testified, "[Victim] was not comfortable around [Hughes].  She had some concerns 
about his . . . drug use and his lifestyle.  And . . . I do know for a fact that she 
talked about getting into some verbal altercations with him." Additionally, Marion 
Beachum stated, "[Victim] told me she was deathly afraid of [Hughes].  That if he 
ever got her alone, he would kill her."
These statements were inadmissible because they not only revealed Victim's state 
of mind, they described the reasons for her state of mind.  See Garcia, 334 S.C. at 
76, 512 S.E.2d at 509 ("[W]hile the present state of the declarant's mind is 
admissible as an exception to hearsay, the reason for the declarant's state of mind is 
not."). Beachum's statement, particularly, closely mirrors the testimony ruled 
inadmissible in Garcia. See id. at 74–76, 512 S.E.2d at 508–09 (holding 
inadmissible a cousin's testimony that the victim told her if she ever left her 
boyfriend he would kill her because it improperly revealed the reason for the 
victim's state of mind).   
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We find unpreserved Hughes's challenge to Few's testimony.  Hughes argues that 
prior to Few's testimony, the court "overruled a defense objection to his 
testimony"; however, our review of the record demonstrates the referenced 
objection was not a hearsay objection but a temporal objection followed by a 
relevance objection to Few's recounting of a 2010 incident when law enforcement 
escorted Hughes from Victim's yard after dark.5 
Hughes did not object to Few's subsequent testimony that on the Thursday before 
her death, Victim related that she was "very scared" because Hughes had been 
released and "[s]he was afraid that [Hughes] was going to come in and kill her.  
That's her words."  See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 
(2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on 
appeal."). Accordingly, we find Hughes failed to preserve a hearsay challenge to 
Few's testimony.  See State v. Johnson, 324 S.C. 38, 41, 476 S.E.2d 681, 682 
(1996) (requiring a contemporaneous objection to preserve an error during trial).   
Significantly, the challenged testimony of Green, Leaphart, and Beachum was 
cumulative to other testimony presented at trial without objection.  Hughes himself 
elicited testimony from Sergeant Miller on cross-examination that various 
witnesses gave Miller the impression that Victim feared Hughes.6 Additionally, 
Hughes entered an April 7 email into evidence wherein Victim told a friend that 
while she was pleased Hughes received a strong sentence on the forgery charges, it 
was "a little un-nerving to know he is out there.  The solicitor's office said one 
5 In 2010, several months after Hughes moved out of Victim's home, Victim called 
Few's wife to ask him to come over because Hughes was in her yard.  Law 
enforcement responded and found Hughes behind a pecan tree on Victim's 
property. Victim never came outside while Hughes was present. 
6 Hughes's questioning of Sergeant Miller suggests he mistakenly believed Miller 
had testified about Victim's fear of Hughes on direct examination. However, 
Miller only testified that when he spoke to Victim's neighbors and coworkers, they 
were "adamant" about who they suspected of killing her. Miller did give some 
testimony that could have implied Victim's fear, such as the existence of a no-
contact order, the deadbolt on Victim's bedroom door, and Victim's trip to the 
magistrate's office on the day she died.
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mess up [and] he will be sent to prison.  Either he rang my doorbell at 7pm last 
night or God did so he would let me know something was up." 
 
Detective Drew Palmer testified Victim told him several times that she was afraid 
of Hughes. Palmer elaborated that "after several times of telling me that she was 
afraid of her son, I said, you know, it probably would be prudent for you to get a 
weapon." Although Hughes initially made a hearsay objection to Detective 
Palmer's testimony, he subsequently withdrew it.7   See State v. King, 416 S.C. 92, 
112, 784 S.E.2d 252, 262 (Ct. App. 2016) ("[W]here an objection is expressly 
withdrawn, it cannot be raised on appeal."), cert. pending. Finally, Jones testified 
without objection that Victim was agitated, frustrated, and fearful when she learned 
Hughes had been released without her knowledge.  Accordingly, we analogize this 
case to Weston and believe any inadmissible testimony was cumulative.  See 367 
S.C. at 288–89, 625 S.E.2d at 646 (finding that even if witnesses' testimony 
concerning victim's fear of defendant was inadmissible, there was no prejudicial 
error because their testimony was cumulative to other witnesses' testimony that 
was admitted without objection).   
 
Additionally, any error in admitting the testimony was harmless due to the 
existence of overwhelming evidence of Hughes's guilt.  See State v. Chavis, 412 
S.C. 101, 110 n.7, 771 S.E.2d 336, 340 n.7 (2015) (stating an error in admitting 
certain testimony could be deemed harmless because of the existence of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt); State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 
150, 151 (1985) (finding the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony harmless in 
light of the other "abundant evidence" of defendant's guilt).  The State's evidence 
established that Hughes was released from jail for forging checks on Victim's trust 
account and ordered to have no contact with Victim.  Nevertheless, Hughes 
admitted that two days later, he was at Victim's home around the same time a 
neighbor last reported seeing her alive.  Sergeant Miller opined that based on the 
crime scene, the crime appeared personal rather than random.  Victim's manner of 
death was consistent with the threat Hughes made in Slavensky's presence and his 
statements to Isakson. Although the DNA match was not definitive, the State's 
 
                                        
 
7 When the State attempted to introduce email correspondence from Victim to 
Detective Palmer, Hughes successfully objected as Victim's correspondence 
detailed threats made by Hughes against his father, uncle, grandmother, and Victim
to an old girlfriend in West Virginia. 
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expert opined that one blood sample from the scene had a "high probability" of 
being a mother/son mixture, and he ruled out Victim's other son as a possible 
contributor. Finally, when Hughes was apprehended, he was driving Victim's 
missing car, had possession of her missing keys and garage door opener, and had a 
cut on one of his fingers. Accordingly, we believe the State presented 
overwhelming evidence of Hughes's guilt such that any errors in the admission of 
hearsay testimony were harmless. 
II. Closing Argument 
Hughes argues he was denied due process when the trial court failed to require the 
State to open fully on both the law and the facts and limit its reply to those matters 
raised in Hughes's closing. Specifically, Hughes contends the current procedure in 
South Carolina allows the State to "sandbag" its arguments and deny the defense 
an opportunity to reply. 
"[T]he conduct of a criminal trial is left largely to the sound discretion of the 
presiding judge and this Court will not interfere unless it clearly appears that the 
rights of the complaining party were abused or prejudiced in some way."  State v. 
Bridges, 278 S.C. 447, 448, 298 S.E.2d 212, 212 (1982).  "The solicitor is not 
required to make an opening argument to the jury on issues of fact, but may do so 
in his discretion."  State v. Rodgers, 269 S.C. 22, 25, 235 S.E.2d 808, 809 (1977) 
(citation omitted).   
Here, the State's opening on the law consisted of a cursory statement that it had 
proven the charges against Hughes beyond a reasonable doubt.  The entire 
"opening on the law" comprised only nine lines of the record.  Hughes then made 
his closing argument, and the State followed by presenting the lengthier portion of 
its closing argument.  Although the State's opening on the law was perfunctory at 
best, we find no error in the circuit court's denial of Hughes's motion.   
Hughes cites the Delaware case of Bailey v. State in support of his argument that 
the State's actions in this case were prejudicial.  440 A.2d 997 (Del. 1982).  In 
Bailey, a prosecutor gave opening remarks lasting only five minutes and merely 
conveyed that "based upon the evidence, the State had proved that the defendant 
had intentionally killed [the victim]."  Id. at 1000. After the defendant's closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued in "rebuttal" for over an hour and discussed the 
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testimony of several witnesses not previously mentioned during either party's
arguments. Id. at 1001. The Supreme Court of Delaware determined it was "unfair 
and often highly prejudicial for . . . State's counsel to avoid treatment of certain 
issues in the opening summation so as to deprive defense counsel of the 
opportunity to reply."  Id. at 1002. Although the court acknowledged that "[t]he 
general rule has evolved to give trial courts a modicum of discretion to allow a 
more substantial rebuttal which is not so narrowly tailored to the scope of defense 
counsel's summation," it reversed the murder conviction based on the trial court's 
abuse of discretion in permitting the prosecutor "to utilize the inherently prejudicial 
'sandbagging' trial strategy."  Id. 
Our supreme court recently considered Bailey in State v. Beaty, an appeal of 
defendant Michael Beaty's conviction and life sentence for the murder of his 
girlfriend. See Op. No. 27693 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 29, 2016) (Shearouse Adv. 
Sh. No. 1 at 13, 16) ("[I]n a criminal trial where the party with the 'middle'
argument requests, the party with the right to the first and last closing argument 
must open in full on the law and the facts, and in reply may respond in full to the 
other party's argument but may not raise new matter.").8  Like the appellant in this 
case, Beaty argued his procedural due process rights were offended when the 
circuit court declined to require the State to open fully on the law and the facts in 
its initial closing argument. Id. at 16. Although the supreme court agreed in part 
with Beaty's due process concern, it found any error in the circuit court's denial of 
Beaty's motion to require the State to "open in full" was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 17. Likewise, we find Hughes is unable to demonstrate 
prejudicial error. Our review of the record reveals that the bulk of the State's
closing argument was confined to content that had already been raised in Hughes's 
closing argument.  Notably, both sides addressed many of the same issues 
including Hughes's motive, the DNA evidence, the blood evidence, the shoe print 
evidence, Isakson's believability as a witness, and whether Hughes's actions in the 
8 Bailey has been cited favorably by courts in other states.  See Presi v. State, 534 
A.2d 370, 370 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (noting Bailey was one of a handful of 
reported criminal cases in which convictions have been reversed because the State 
was allowed to raise a new and prejudicial issue in rebuttal); Jenner v. Leapley, 
521 N.W.2d 422, 429 (S.D. 1994) (citing Bailey for the proposition that a 
prosecutor's tactic of presenting new arguments during his final argument can 
result in reversible error).
26 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
days following the murder were consistent with guilt.  Therefore, we find any error 
in the circuit court's denial of Hughes's motion to require that the State "open in 
full and limit its reply" was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (applying a harmless constitutional violation 
standard).
CONCLUSION
Hughes's convictions are  
AFFIRMED. 

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur. 
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